Two Poles of Deliberative Democracy
I wanted to start making these posts weeks ago, but got sidetracked. I’ve already tried to put a Deweyan notion of democracy into a nutshell here. I’d like to start talking about a vein of democratic theory that’s seen a lot of activity in the last couple of decades, deliberative democracy. Depending on how you view it, it can be a complement or an alternative to the Deweyan notion, but we’ll have time to talk about that later. For now I want to sketch a definition and present one of the key discussion points within the ranks of those who call themselves deliberative democrats.
These theorists, in some fashion or another, argue that those who would set policies must take into account those who will be affected by the laws and be able to provide some kind of justification for the decision. Most, although not all, deliberative democrats argue that this should take the form of citizens actually participating in a process of joint discussion in an effort to reach a conclusion. One of the most significant disagreements between deliberative democratic theorists was over the requirements for the deliberative process itself. Some, such as Jurgen Habermas, argued that theorists could not draw substantial conclusions about what kind of policies deliberators could settle upon, because that is exactly the kind of question deliberation is supposed to settle. In other words, theorists could not establish a definition of good or correct policies – they could only establish fair procedures for deliberation, and whatever policy resulted from such a procedure would, by definition, be good and correct. Habermas argues that although moral conclusions are not identical to conclusions about the physical universe, they are close enough that an effort to reach impartial conclusions is valuable. What we need to do is find the conclusions that we would all rationally agree to because accepting them is in everyone’s interest. Habermas calls this the principle of universalization; a norm is valid if
All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects of its general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and those consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation).(1)
Habermas argues that we can not test a norm by this standard merely by thinking about whether or not the norm is truly universal. Not only is it difficult for any one of us to truly put ourselves in the minds of so many other people, we have no way of knowing if our imaginative check for universality has been successful. It is not enough for us to think that everyone would accept the norm. We have to have good reason to believe that they would. We need to actually talk to other people and get their perspectives for this to work. Habermas says:
What is needed is a “real� process of argumentation in which the individuals concerned cooperate. Only an intersubjective process of reaching understanding can produce an agreement that is reflexive in nature; only it can give the participants the knowledge that they have collectively become convinced of something.(2)
This leads Habermas to propose the principle of discourse ethics: “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.�(3) Habermas says that there are some substantive principles that must be followed for a discourse to be acceptable, although he does not detail an exhaustive set of inviolable rules. (Example of the types of principles he means include “participants can not contradict themselves� and “participants must be free to speak and to question anything brought up in the course of the discussion.�)(4) But beyond these minimal rules, moral conclusions must be reached through actual discourse, not through the reasonings of a single individual that they would be acceptable if such a discourse occurred.
Rawls, like many other theorists, argues that it is easy to imagine situations in which a fair procedure could result in a policy that damages citizens and runs afoul of our sense of ethics. For example, a majority could agree to somehow restrict the activity of a minority. We want to be able to say that, for example, racial discrimination is wrong even if it could be made legal through a legitimate procedure. This means that our theory of deliberative democracy must conform to some substantial ethical and moral standards in addition to embodying fair procedures. Rawls originally developed a justification for liberal democracy in Theory of Justice using a social contract model. He suggests that we imagine a group of people who do not know their race; their class; their education; their location; their natural physical, intellectual, and emotional capabilities; or anything else which might induce them to try and jigger the social structure to give them an advantage. From this position of total neutrality, they are to consider a list of options and choose the state structure which they deem fair, the society in which they would feel their position is just and fair, regardless of what that position turns out to be. Because this is a hypothetical situation and not an actual one, any member of our actual society should be able to imagine himself or herself in this initial position, and from that position evaluate his or her current society to see how it lives up the ideal of justice as fairness. The two fundamental principles that Rawls believes can be rationally derived are that 1) every citizen must have an equal share in basic liberties, and 2) any inequality in the distribution of resources or opportunities must be to the advantage of every member of society.
Later, in Political Liberalism, Rawls identified himself as a deliberative democrat, while keeping his commitment to a justification based on substantive principles. He argues for a system of public reason in which we can discover substantive moral principles if we rationally try to determine that which we should be universally willing to agree to. He cites the deliberations of national supreme courts as a strong example of public reason used by ruling officials. In legislative or executive branches, decisions are often made due to political concerns and justified by reasons that the entire population might not share. If a majority of legislators share a particular religiously-inspired world view, for example, there is no reason to expect that they will not introduce legislation that reflects that world view, and argue that they are justified in doing so because they are representing the will of the constituents that voted them into office. Lawmakers and chief executives are often expected to make decisions based on classified information that is not made accessible to the public. According to Rawls, in a democratic society, competing visions of the good can co-exist because in a world of “reasonable pluralism� there is enough of a common ground between these competing groups to form the basis for a set of reasons and justifications that all can agree to – there is an overlapping consensus that makes democratic society viable. Decisions are made by appeal to the core tenets which are agreed to by all reasonable citizens and defended according to a process of reasoning that is debated with fellow experts and made accessible to the public.(5)
(1) Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Translated by Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge: MIT Press.1990. Page 65.
(2) Habermas 67
(3) Habermas 66
(4) Habermas discusses the type of principles that must be followed for proper discourse in 87-94, and uses these to help justify his principle of universalization.
(5) Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. Paperback Edition. New York: Columbia University Press. 1996.
About Dave Thomer
Born and raised in Philadelphia. Studied philosophy at Fordham University in the Bronx, where I made many great friends and met my wonderful wife. We moved back to Philadelphia, where I studied philosophy some more and became a teacher. Online and off, I'm looking for ways that we can be better citizens and build stronger communities.